GÉRARD GENETTE

Narrative Discourse Revisited

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Cornell University Press

Ithaca, New York
Dorrit Cohn's third criticism bears on the assimilation I made (at least from the viewpoint of narrative treatment) of thought to speech, viewing all "consciousness" as if it consisted of inner speech. This criticism is inseparable from her own work, whose aim is, precisely, to create for the "presentation of consciousness" the special place it deserves, and so I cannot respond to her criticism without saying something about her book itself.

Remember, first, that for Dorrit Cohn the three basic techniques of the presentation of consciousness are psycho-narration, the analysis of a character's thoughts taken on directly by the narrator, quoted monologue, a literal citation of those thoughts as they are verbalized in inner speech, of which the "interior monologue" is only a more autonomous variant; and finally, narrated monologue, monologue relayed by the narrator in the form of indirect discourse, governed or free. It is clear that except for our difference in scope (Cohn is not concerned with speeches actually uttered), her categories and mine are completely interchangeable, but the interchange reveals three differences.

The first bears on choice of terms: her "psycho-narration" is my "narratized speech," her "quoted monologue" is my "reported speech," and her "narrated monologue" is my "transposed speech." I confess that I fail to perceive the advantage of this modification. "Narrated" seems to me too strong (and thus too close to -narrative) to refer to indirect discourse, and I persist in reserving it for the forms (of the kind "I decided to marry Albertine") that treat speech or thought as an event, while retaining "transposed," whose grammatical connotation is clear, for indirect speech.

The second difference bears on the order she selected. Several times Dorrit Cohn calls her "narrated monologue" an intermediate mode, so I fail to understand why she places it third. I prefer to leave it in the second spot, to which I assigned it in what is indeed a systematic progression.

The third disagreement results from the radical separation Dorrit Cohn makes between "third-person" and "first-person" narratives and from the prime strategic importance she attributes to that separation. It governs the two parts of her book (I. "Consciousness in Third-Person Context"; II. "Consciousness in First-Person Texts"), and to a certain extent it leads her to deal with the same forms twice, depending on whether they occur in a hetero- or a homodiegetic narration. It seems to me, however, that formally the encompassing narrative situation has no effect on the status of either the discourse or the psychic state evoked. I scarcely see what

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1Cohn, Transparent Minds, p. 24 and passim.

2In a letter to A. Bosquet (Correspondance, ed. Conard, V, 321), Flaubert advised "recounting" the words of a secondary character. This term gives a little backing to my "narratized," but to tell the truth we don't know whether here it applies to narratization strictly speaking (as when, in Bouvard, ""You are not right," said the hostess, "he is an excellent man") becomes "the hostess said some words in the curé's defense" (Modern Library Edition, trans. Francis Steegmuller, p. 88) or to a plain indirect discourse, which is Flaubert's most frequent position—in short, whether he is using my terminology or Dorrit Cohn's. See Claudine Goihot-Mersch, Travail de Flaubert (Paris: Seuil, 1983).
Narrative of Thoughts?

(Other than the grammatical person, of course) distinguishes, for example, *auto-(psycho)narration* from *psycho-narration*, auto-narrated monologue from (hetero)narrated monologue. I have particular difficulty understanding why Dorrit Cohn links her study of autonomous monologue to first-person narrative: *Ulysses* taken as a whole is not, to my knowledge, a first-person novel. If her reason is that Molly Bloom’s monologue is *in itself* in the first person, the reason is meaningless, because Molly Bloom’s monologue is no more in the first person than are the (non-autonomous) quoted monologues present in the classical heterodiegetic novel, which she correctly deals with in her first part. This peculiarity of distribution seems to me to be due to a misplaced desire to divide up—that is, to an overvaluation of the criterion of person.

We will come back to this far-reaching difference apropos of voice.

The fourth and final difference, which I mentioned earlier and to which I now return, is the assimilation—which I made and which Dorrit Cohn, rightly, rejects—of “consciousness” to inner speech. Cohn legitimately insists on making a place for the nonverbal forms of consciousness, and I was certainly wrong to classify as “narrated inner speech” a statement such as “I decided to marry Albertine,” which is by no means necessarily tied to a verbalized thought. A fortiori, no doubt, for something like “I fell in love with Albertine.” But I note that, of the three modes of presentation differentiated by Cohn, only the first makes a place for this question; by definition, quoted monologue and narrated monologue treat thought as speech, in her work as in mine (and once again, that is why “narrated” here seems to me ill chosen or, rather, ill placed). Only “psycho-narration” may be assumed to apply to a nonverbal thought (falling in love with Albertine, or with anyone else, without saying so to oneself or, indeed, without being aware of it). But note that I say: *may*. Falling in love with Albertine, or with her neighbor, *may also* consist of an inner speech, and on this point the psycho-narrative statement says neither yea nor nay, except perhaps when it takes pains to mark the unconscious nature of the state represented. If a narrator writes, “Marcel, without noticing it, had fallen in love with Albertine,” he takes the exceptional step of letting us know that the sentence “So now I am in love with Albertine” does not appear in Marcel’s inner speech—which still falls short of ensuring that such speech is absent. Marcel might, in such a case, “say to himself” other sentences, and particularly this one: “I am not in love with Albertine”—which the perspicacious narrator decodes for him.

In short, Dorrit Cohn’s justifiable reservation about a possible nonverbalized consciousness holds good only *partly* for *one* of her three categories. Let us arbitrarily figure this part at 1/6. Cohn’s reservation holds good for 1/6 of her own system. I will not be petty enough to deduce from this that I am 5/6 right in disagreeing with her. I will, rather, conclude that the narrative of thoughts (since that, indeed, is what we are dealing with) always and completely comes down either, as I was too quick to say, to a narrative of words or—as I ought to have said with respect to the cases in which it does not *with its own technique* set forth these thoughts as verbal—to a narrative of events. Once again, narrative recognizes only events or speeches (which are a particular type of event, the only type that may be directly quoted in a verbal narrative). In

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*Obviously, this is not a matter of taking sides on the stale exam question “Is there thought without language?” but only of making a place for the forms of “representation” that do not decide that question in the negative.*

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*Several times, moreover, Dorrit Cohn recognizes the identity of problems in the two types of narrative situation (pp. 14, 143, 158, 169); and the fundamental opposition between consonance and dissonance (of character and narrator) plays the same role in both parts of her book.*
verbal narrative, “consciousness” can be only one or the other.

To this blunt dichotomy, Doležel and Schmid add another, to which I have already alluded. In a narrative, they say, there are and there can be only two sorts of text: the text of the narrator (Erzählerstext) or the text of a character (Personentext). It may be tempting to line up these two oppositions as equivalents; that is what Pierre van den Heuvel does. But things are not so simple. My dichotomy is by object, Doležel’s is by mode, and the two are not reducible, for some narratives of events can be taken on by a character and some narratives of words can be taken on by the narrator. So it would be better to dissociate the criteria and to have them intersect in one of those double-entry tables with which I have not yet had the opportunity of embellishing this little book. In such a table we would differentiate between the narrative of events as taken on by the narrator’s discourse (primary narrative with an extradiegetic narrator) and the narrative of events as taken on by a character’s discourse (secondary narrative with an intradiegetic narrator, or a character-narrator) and between the narrative of words as taken on by the narrator’s discourse (either narratized or transposed discourse) and the narrative of words as taken on by a character’s discourse (either reported or transposed discourse). So we would have this grid:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Narrator’s discourse</th>
<th>Character’s discourse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Narrator’s discourse</td>
<td>Character’s discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Words</td>
<td>Narrated speech and transposed speech</td>
<td>Reported speech and transposed speech</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As one can see, I put “transposed speech” (indirect styles) into two slots at once; I had hesitated and begun to envis-
11 Perspective

The distinction between the two questions "Who sees?" (a question of mood) and "Who speaks?" (a question of voice) is generally accepted today, at least in principle. My only regret is that I used a purely visual, and hence overly narrow, formulation. The end of the scene between Charlus and Jupien in *Sodome* is indeed focalized through Marcel, but that focalization is auditory. There would have been no point in taking it as auditory. There would have been no point in taking great pains to replace point of view with focalization if I was only going to fall right back into the same old rut; so obviously we must replace who sees? with the broader question of who perceives? But the very symmetry between "Who perceives?" and "Who speaks?" is perhaps slightly facetious: the narrator’s voice is indeed always conveyed as the voice of a person, even if anonymous, but the focal position, when there is one, is not always identified with a person. That, it seems to me, is the case with external focalization. So perhaps it would be better to ask, in a more neutral way, where is the focus of perception?—and this focus may or may not (and I will return to this) be embodied in a character.

My criticism of earlier classifications (Brooks and Warren, Stanzel, Friedman, Booth, Romberg) obviously bears on the confusion they produced between mood and voice, either

(Friedman, Booth) by christening “narrator” a focal character who never opens his mouth\(^1\) or by classifying complex narrative situations (mood + voice) under the heading of “point of view.” That is obviously the case for Brooks and Warren, Friedman, and Booth, but indeed much less so for Stanzel and Romberg, whom we can reproach only for presenting differences in point of view and differences in narrative enunciating as if the two were equivalent.

But the common and sometimes glaring confusion between mood and voice, focalization and narration, is one thing; bringing mood and voice together within the more complex (synthetic) idea of “narrative situation” is something else. I acknowledged (pp. 188–189) this synthesis as legitimate, but I rightly refused to consider it “here”—that is, under the single heading of “point of view.” I thereby implicitly committed myself to considering it elsewhere and did not honor that commitment in *Narrative Discourse*. A little later I will try to make good the omission.

My study of focalizations has caused much ink to flow—no doubt, a little too much. It was never anything but a reformulation, whose main advantage was to draw together and systematize such standard ideas as “narrative with an omniscient narrator” or “vision from behind” (zero focalization); “narrative with point of view, reflector, selective omniscience, restriction of field” or “vision with” (internal focalization); or “objective,\(^2\) behaviorist technique” or “vision from

\(^{1}\) As Dorrit Cohn rightly says, it is proper to “put a stop . . . to the sloppy habit of calling the protagonists of figural novels (Stephen of the Portrait, Gregor Samsa, or Strether) the ‘narrators’ of their stories” (*Encirclement of Narrative,* p. 171).

\(^{2}\) The importance of this typically modern mode was, I think, first pointed out in France by Claude-Edmond Magny in *L’Age du roman américalin* (Paris: Seuil, 1948) in the chapter “La Technique objective.” Magny’s study is sighted today: people often steal from it without acknowledging, and sometimes without being aware, that they are doing so. Yet in many respects it
without" (external focalization). My own contribution lay in the study of those "alterations" of the dominant modal course of a narrative to which we have given the names paralipsis (the holding back of information that would be logically produced under the type of focalization selected) and paraleipsis (information in excess of what is called for by the logic of the type selected).

Once or twice people have noted in my pages some confusion between mood and voice—a "pre-Genettean" sin, as Mieke Bal says, that I ought to be the last person to commit (or rather, if history moves forward, the first person to stop committing). I sinned at least by ellipsis or imprecision.

First, in the examples I gave of multiple focalization (epistolary novel, The Ring and the Book), the change in focus is manifestly accompanied—and I ought at least to have said so—by a change in narrator, and there the transfocalization may seem simply a consequence of the transvocalization. Moreover, I know of no example of pure transfocalization, where "the same story" is told successively from several points of view but by the same heterodiegetic narrator. That would, however, be more interesting, for the presumed objectivity of the narrating would, as in movies, accentuate the effect of dissonance among versions. That challenge remains to be met, the sooner the better.

Next, apropos of external focalization in Hammett, I ought to have said explicitly that it functions sometimes (The Glass Key, The Maltese Falcon) in heterodiegetic narration, sometimes (The Dain Curse, Red Harvest, The Thin Man) in homodiegetic narration. I will come back to this, but for me it was the starting point of French narratology, which was stimulated by its juxtaposition of the American novel and cinematographic technique. Its omission from the bibliography of Narrative Discourse is entirely typical—and all the more unjustifiable since, after reading and admiring the book when it was first published, I drew attention to it in 1966 in the dossier of Communications 8 (1966), 166. An interminable memory.

...does indeed prove the relative autonomy of choices of mood in relation to choices of voice, and reciprocally. The same comment apropos of the celebrated paralipsis in Roger Ackroyd: Shlomith Rimmon reproaches me for citing that novel as an example of focalization through the hero (the murderer) "without mentioning the fact that the focus-murderer is also the narrator, when this is clearly the main 'trick' used in the novel." I do not share her way of looking at it. The trick here lies in the paralipsis—that is, in the omission of essential information that focalization through the murderer ought to include. The fact of entrusting the narrating to him is only a way of emphasizing and, if one wishes, of ensuring that focalization—and consequently that paralipsis. And I persist in thinking that a clearly indicated heterodiegetic internal focalization, as in The Ambassadors or Portrait of the Artist, would have produced the same effect.

External focalization was certainly not invented by the writers of American novels between the two world wars. They broke new ground only by maintaining external focalization throughout the entire length of a narrative, generally a brief
one. I drew attention (pp. 190–191) to the classical novel’s use of external focalization in introductions, and I contrasted that practice, "still" manifest in Germinal, with the practice James followed in his late novels, where the character whose presence opens the action is presumed at the very start to be known. I was suggesting a historical evolution about which I had scarcely more than a wholly intuitive view; I was also naively setting foot in a sensitive area that had already been investigated. Let me add just a word or two on the subject.

The historical study I called for is currently being undertaken only, to my knowledge, by Jaap Lintvelt at Groningen; his investigation bears on the beginnings of modern novels. I had in mind particularly a verification (or refutation) of my historical hypothesis of a change having occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century; and with the help of a three-year-old child, I undertook a spot check of some major novels from the eighteenth century to the twentieth. If we roughly contrast two types of incipit—type A (which assumes the character to be unknown to the reader, looks at him first from the outside—thus taking on, in a way, the reader’s ignorance—and then formally introduces him, as in Peau de chagrin) and type B (which at the outset assumes the character to be known and immediately refers to him by his name, even his first name, even simply a personal pronoun or a “familiarizing”\(^5\) definite article)—we note that the history of the modern novel shows a significant evolution. Roughly speaking, it consists of a transition from type A, which predominates\(^6\) up to but not including Zola (but it is still present, then, in La Fortune des Rougon, Nana, Pot-Bouille, and Germinal), to type B, which is already represented in La Curée (of the twenty Rougon-Macquart novels, fourteen are distinct cases of type B). In James we find a clear transition, from a predominance of A up to The Bostonians to a predominance of B dating from Casamassima (both published in 1888) and on to the end. The turning point, perhaps provisionally, is indeed, therefore, located in that zone, let us say symbolically 1885.

The use of type B is striking in the twentieth century in such novels as Ulysses, The Trial or The Castle, Les Thibault, La Condition humaine, or Aurélien, and the novella is apt to take the elliptical introduction so far as to use a simple pronoun or definite article (“Hills Like White Elephants”:\ “The American and the girl . . .”). That practice is rarer, perhaps, in the novel, but it is used in For Whom the Bell Tolls (“He lay flat . . .”),\(^7\) and in 1900 Conrad opened Lord Jim with a “He” that only after a full page becomes a very discreet “Jim”:\ “Jim had always good wages . . . just Jim—nothing more. He had, of course, another name, but he was anxious that it should not

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\(^5\) Bronzwaer, referred to by Stanzel (“Teller-Characters and Reflective Characters in Narrative Theory,” Poetics Today 2 (1981), 11. (In a term that is very metonymical but very eloquent, Damourette and Pichon, I think, call the definite article “notorious” [Jacques Damourette and Edouard Pichon, Des mots à la pensée: Essai de grammaire de la langue française, 7 vols., Paris, Collection des linguistes contemporains, 1911–1940].) On the focalizing value of characters’ names, see Boris Uspenski (A Poetics of Composition [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973]). There is, indeed, no question but that calling his heroine Madame Bovary, or Madame, or Emma can express the narrator’s degrees of familiarity and/or the choice of one or another focal character.

\(^6\) In the extreme form of an external focalization in which the ignorance is conspicuous and is emphasized by an observer’s assumptions (“by his appearance one recognized,” “by his physiognomy one guessed,” etc.), as in La Peau de chagrin, Pons, Bette, Le Médecin de campagne, Splendeurs et misères; or in the form (also frequent in Balzac) of a descriptive and/or historical panoramic opening: Goriot, Grandet, Illusions perdues, Curé de village, Recherche de l’absolu, Vieille Fille, etc.

\(^7\) On the familiarizing effect for the reader of that narrative stance, see Walter Ong, “The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” PMLA 90 (1975), 12–15. As Father Ong shows full well, these allusive designations (pseudo-anaphorics or pseudo-deictics) force the reader into a relationship of intimacy and complicity with the author—a relationship the reader is prevented from refusing (by even so much as an “uncooperative” question like “Who is this ‘he’? What American? What girl?”) by the sly intimidation that is inherent (as we would say today) in all presupposition.
be pronounced"—and, if I am not mistaken, in actual fact it
never will be, for us.

These openings that use pronouns have been studied by
J. M. Backus, who speaks of "nonsequential sequence-sig-
nals"; referentials without reference, anaphors without an-
tecedents, but whose function is precisely to simulate, and
thereby to constitute, a reference, and to impose it on the
reader by way of presupposition. Roland Harweg, using
Pike’s terms, contrasts "emic" openings (with a character’s
name) and "etic" openings (with only a pronoun). But the
question transcends the use of pronouns or definite arti-
cles. A simple pronoun is obviously more "etic" than a complete
denomination (first and last names), which itself is more
"etic" than a formal introduction coming after the "tracking
shot" of the Balzacian novel. There is in fact a whole gra-
duation, with subtle and variable nuances depending on context,
from the pole of most explicitness (à la Balzac: "June 15, 1952,
at five o’clock, a young woman emerged from an elegant
hotel located at 54 rue de Varenne, . . .") and, after a few
pages of description, "This elegant woman walking was none
other than the Marquise of . . .") to the pole of most implicit-
ness (à la Duras: "She saw that it was five o’clock. She went
out . . .").), with Valéry’s formulation definitely an intermedi-
ary degree: "The Marquise." What Marquise? As Stanzel
remarks, the etic or implicit pole is obviously closely related
to his own "figural" narrative type—that is, to internal focal-
ization—and therefore to a certain novelistic modernity.

The investigation, of course, remains open and ought to
take into account both individual and generic details. The
novella, as we have seen and for obvious reasons, is more
elliptical than the novel; the historical novel can be more ellip-
tical than pure fiction, since some of its characters are by
definition assumed to be "well known." Formal details ought
also to be taken into account, and here homodiegetic narrat-
ing introduces a special feature: the pronoun I is both etic and
emic, since we know at least that it designates the narrator.
But it certainly seems to have undergone the same general
evolution, from the formal presentation of the picaresque
novel ("Your Excellency, then, should know first of all that I
am called Lázaro de Tormes, son of Thomé González" to
Proustian ellipsis, by way of Melville’s casual familiarity
("Call me Ishmael."))

12 Focalizations

My definition of the types of focalization was criticized and overhauled by Mieke Bal on the basis of what seems to me an unreasonable desire to set up focalization as a narrative instance (or agent). Mieke Bal seems to have—and sometimes to attribute to me (p. 248)—the idea that every narrative statement includes a focalizer (character) and a focalized (character). In her view, in internal focalization the focalized character is at the same time the focalizer ("the 'focalized' character sees"), but in external focalization, the focalized character is only focalized ("he does not see, he is seen"). And (still according to her) I conceal this asymmetry by my "nonchalant" use of the expression "focalization on" [focalisation sur] instead of "focalization by," which allegedly leads me to "treat . . . Phileas and his valet as almost interchangeable agents—treating the subject (Passepartout) or the object (Phileas) alike as "focalized"" (p. 241). I find it quite difficult to enter into this argument, for in her statement of my position, Mieke Bal in-

roduces ideas (focalizer, focalized) I never thought of using because they are incompatible with my conception of the matter. For me, there is no focalizing or focalized character: focalized can be applied only to the narrative itself, and if focalizer applied to anyone, it could only be the person who focalizes the narrative—that is, the narrator, or, if one wanted to go outside the conventions of fiction, the author himself, who delegates (or does not delegate) to the narrator his power of focalizing or not focalizing.

In her debate with Bronzwaer, Mieke Bal denies I admit the existence of "nonfocalized passages" and claims I specify that such a category is applicable only to narratives taken as a whole. That obviously means that the analysis of a "nonfocalized" narrative must always be reducible to a mosaic of variously focalized segments and, therefore, that "zero focalization" = variable focalization. That formula would not bother me in the least, but it seems to me that classical narrative sometimes places its "focus" at a point so indefinite, or so remote, with so panoramic a field (the well-known "viewpoint of God," or of Sirius, about which people periodically wonder whether it is indeed a point of view) that it cannot coincide with any character and that the term nonfocalization, or zero focalization, is rather more appropriate for it. Unlike the director of a movie, the novelist is not compelled to put his camera somewhere; he has no camera. Instead,

3Mieke Bal, "The Laughing Mice, or: On Focalization," Poetics Today 2 (1981), 205. [Bal's statement was that "Genette (recognizes unfocalized passages) but in relation to a definition of focalization as a typology of texts, not as an indispensable narrative device."]

4It is true that today he may pretend to have one (the return effect of one medium on another). On the difference between focalization and "ocularization" (information and perception) and on the usefulness of this distinction for the technique of movies and the Nouveau Roman, see François Jost, "Narration(s): en déca et au-delà," Communications 38 (1985), and "Du nouveau roman au nouveau romancier: Questions de narratologie," thesis.
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therefore, the right formula would be: zero focalization = variable, and sometimes zero, focalization. Here as elsewhere, the choice is purely operational. This looseness will undoubtedly shock some people, but I see no reason for requiring narratology to become a catechism with a yes-or-no answer to check off for each question, when often the proper answer would be that it depends on the day, the context, and the way the wind is blowing.

So by focalization I certainly mean a restriction of “field”—actually, that is, a selection of narrative information with respect to what was traditionally called omniscience. In pure fiction that term is, literally, absurd (the author has nothing to “know,” since he invents everything), and we would be better off replacing it with completeness of information—which, when supplied to a reader, makes him “omniscient.” The instrument of this possible selection is a situated focus, a sort of information-conveying pipe that allows passage only of information that is authorized by the situation (Marcel on his steep slope outside the window at Montjouvain). In internal focalization, the focus coincides with a character, who then becomes the fictive “subject” of all the perceptions, including those that concern himself as object. The narrative in that case can tell us everything this character perceives and everything he thinks (it never does, either because it refuses to give irrelevant information or because it deliberately withholds some bit of relevant information [paralipsis], like the moment and the memory of the crime in Roger Ackroyd). In principle it is supposed to tell us nothing else. If it does, that is again an alteration (paralepsis), in other words, an infraction, inten-

(École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1983), chapter 3 ("La Mobilité narrative"). Turning back from those extreme cases to the ordinary condition of narrative, I find Jost's work the most relevant contribution to the debate on focalization and to the necessary refining of that notion.
points simultaneously. Certainly, I am unable to demonstrate this. But it is up to Sieve Bari to demonstrate the contrary.

A final note on the matter of focalization: at least twice (pp. 205 and 216) I used an expression that is fairly

noted in the literature: that of focalization. Here is a brief

description of focalization: the term focuses on the

narrator, rather than on the character being described.

The narrator is the focus of attention, and the

character is described indirectly. This technique can be

used to create a sense of intimacy between the reader and

the narrator.

On this point and some others, the shortings of Ake Bari's method

of focalization, Pariser, 51 (1983), 39-56. But one inerrable truth of the

Poliedric system, which ended up unable to function without the system.

The question now, of course, is to know who is polished—and everyone

believes himself to be Cappuccini.
what I don’t guess, I make up." As for the homodiegetic narrator, he is obliged to justify ("How do you know that?") the information he gives about scenes from which "he" was absent as a character, about someone else’s thoughts, etc., and any breach of that trust is a paralepsis. This is manifestly the situation for Bergotte's deathbed thoughts, which absolutely no one but Bergotte could know, and it is less distinctly the situation for many other people’s thoughts, which there is little likelihood of Marcel’s ever having come to know. We could therefore say that homodiegetic narrative, as a consequence of its “vocal” selection, submits a priori to a modal restriction, one that can be sidestepped only by an infraction, or a perceptible distortion. To designate that constraint, perhaps we should speak of prefocalization? Well, now we have.

8Meir Sternberg (Expositional Modes, chapters 8 and 9) opportunely distinguishes, among these omniscient narrators, the omnicommmunicative narrators (who apparently give the reader all the information they have—see Trollope’s novels) and the suppressive narrators (who hold back part, whether explicitly or not, permanently or not, etc., by ellipses or paralipses—see Tom Jones). But of course this distinction is equally well applicable to focalized narratives (see Roger Ackroyd).